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Note 
 
Anticompetitive Until Proven Innocent: An 
Antitrust Proposal To Embargo Covert Patent 
Privateering Against Small Businesses 
Kyle R. Kroll* 
Imagine you are a corporate juggernaut, a titan of indus-
try, a business behemoth, the figurative 800-pound gorilla—the 
prospective monopolist, perhaps. For the most part, you domi-
nate your industry in terms of market share, sales, and reputa-
tion.1 Your success in business has enabled you to spend sizea-
ble amounts of money in research and development (R&D), and 
as a result you have an extensive portfolio of patents and other 
intellectual property.2  
Business is good, but you are not without faults. New 
startups constantly force you to adapt and enhance your prod-
ucts and services, costing you enormous financial resources. 
And because you are larger, it usually takes you longer to re-
spond and pivot to counter smaller competitors.3 New rivals 
present a very real danger to your continued dominance. Your 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.B. 
2013, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. Thank you to 
Professor Thomas Cotter for his guidance while working on this Note. Addi-
tional thanks must be given to my friends and family and the wonderful edi-
tors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their support and feedback. I 
am hopeful that federal courts, legislators, or regulators will find this Note in 
their research and consider implementing the solution within. Copyright © 
2016 by Kyle R. Kroll. 
 1. See Microeconomics—Characteristics of Monopolies, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/microeconomics/  
characteristics-monopolies.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 2. See Maximilian A. Grant et al., Getting Your House in Order: Patent 
Ownership and the Corporate Structure, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.bna.com/patent-ownership-and-the-corporate-structure. 
 3. Anita Campbell, Are Big Companies Better Innovators than Small 
Ones?, OPEN FORUM (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.americanexpress.com/us/ 
small-business/openforum/articles/are-big-companies-better-innovators-than 
-small-ones (“Corporations move at a glacial pace. They may be faster now, but 
‘fast’ is still a relative term when you’re talking about multinational firms. . . . 
Small companies have the advantage when it comes to innovation.”). 
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patents do not perfectly “cover” their inventions, but it may be 
plausible to convince a court that your rivals are infringing on 
at least some aspects.4 Although patent litigation is expensive, 
you have a large war chest, and you know that small companies 
often crumble under the weight of a patent infringement suit.5 
But if you sue competitors, that might harm your pristine repu-
tation with consumers, business partners, and regulators.6 And 
it might result in counter-suit. 
Your lawyers tell you that in recent decades, a new model 
of patent litigation has emerged. Instead of suing infringers in 
their own names, “practicing”7 companies are now outsourcing 
patent litigation to non-practicing patent assertion entities 
(PAEs, a name used by the Federal Trade Commission).8 Out-
sourcing patent litigation to PAEs is often cheaper, more lucra-
tive, and very effective, but most importantly, PAEs allow prac-
ticing companies to secretly manipulate and hinder rivals via 
patent litigation.9  
While outsourcing patent litigation to PAEs may be benefi-
cial to a hypothetical large business, experts and policy-makers 
are concerned about the negative effects such arrangements 
may have on competition and consumers.10 Commentators ar-
 
 4. See, e.g., Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just 
About Worthless, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-companies-patents-are-just-about 
-worthless (“[F]requently two issued patents arguably describe the same 
thing.”). The doctrine of equivalents may provide broader coverage, at least 
facially.  
 5. See infra Part II.A (describing the effects of patent litigation on small 
businesses). 
 6. See infra note 58; see also Michelle Cramer, Being Sued by Big Busi-
ness Competition, GREATFX PRINTING (Oct. 27, 2015), http://buzz 
.greatfxprinting.com/being-sued-by-big-business-competition.htm (describing 
one small business entrepreneur’s tactic of using online public relations to “get 
the public on his side and put the heat on [his larger competitor]”).  
 7. Companies that “practice” their patents are those which actually cre-
ate products and services based on their patented inventions. See Kailash 
Choudhary & Priyanka Rastogi, Non Practicing Entities (NPEs) and Their 
Impacts, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail 
.aspx?g=2bc351e0-c393-4637-9c38-306ff7713557.  
 8. See, e.g., Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2016).  
 9. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 10. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the 
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129–70 (2013) (examining the economics of 
patent assertion by trolls and practicing entities); cf. eBay Inc. v. 
  
2016] COVERT PATENT PRIVATEERING 2169 
 
gue that PAE patent litigation stifles investment and innova-
tion.11 For this reason in particular, policy-makers are wary of 
PAEs,12 especially now that PAEs bring over half of all patent 
lawsuits.13 News stories and research also confirm that the hy-
pothetical scenario explained above is increasingly a reality.14  
“Privateering” is a very concerning and increasingly popu-
lar PAE arrangement. In privateering, PAEs are directed—or 
“privateered”—by “sponsor” companies and used to harass 
those companies’ rivals and raise rivals’ costs.15 In its most 
primitive form, privateering entails patent litigation brought 
by a PAE against tens to hundreds of targeted companies—
usually rivals of the sponsor. When successful, privateering di-
rectly benefits the PAE through settlement or damages awards. 
But this reward is insignificant in comparison to the indirect 
benefits that inure to the sponsor as a result of reduced compe-
tition.  
In recent decades, scholars have criticized PAEs.16 They 
have focused on addressing “patent trolls”—an older and more-
 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 398 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(recognizing and criticizing patent trolls). 
 11. Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (stating 
that privateering is a competitive tool); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 
2124; see also Stephen Kiebzak et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Pa-
tent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 RES. POL’Y 218, 229 
(2016) (stating that over $21 billion in venture capital has been withheld due 
to PAE patent litigation). 
 12. See, e.g., FTC Seeks To Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their 
Impact on Innovation, Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine 
-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact. 
 13. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2123.  
 14. See Ian D. McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Market-
place for Patents: Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18 
CHAP. L. REV. 759, 778 (2015) (listing numerous examples of “creative patent 
transactions and privateering deals structured by companies since 2008”); see 
also Florian Mueller, Privateering: Let’s Name and Shame Companies That 
Feed Patent Trolls—Please Help Complete the List, FOSS PATENTS (May 12, 
2015), http://www.fosspatents.com/2015/05/privateering-lets-name-and-shame 
.html (listing transfers from Apple, BlackBerry, British Telecom, Ericsson, 
Huawei, Nokia, Sony, and Panasonic to patent privateers).  
 15. See Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of 
Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L.J. 109, 111–14 (2012); Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent 
Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTI-
TRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 1. 
 16. See, e.g., Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Is-
sues, ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 10; see also Thomas H. Chia, Note, 
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publicized type of PAE—but have not addressed patent priva-
teering. And those who have addressed patent privateering 
have thus far focused only on the legal implications of the ac-
quisition and aggregation of patents by a PAE, but not spon-
sored litigation against targeted rivals.17 Some scholars assert 
that the best way to address PAE patent litigation is to reform 
patent law instead of reforming or employing other areas of 
law, such as antitrust law.18 However, Congress has been slow 
to act in addressing defects in patent law,19 so the development 
of other solutions may be necessary to address patent priva-
teering.  
Commentators are optimistic that antitrust law can pro-
vide answers.20 Among the existing commentary, though, schol-
ars have primarily focused on the effects of patent privateering 
on business at-large; they have not focused on how small busi-
nesses—those most likely to be targets of patent privateer-
ing21—are affected. Thus, the existing commentary overlooks 
the most pressing patent privateering concerns.  
This Note analyzes how current U.S. antitrust law could be 
applied to address patent privateering against small business-
es. Part I explores the history, logistics, and effects of PAE pri-
vateering and reviews relevant patent and antitrust laws. Part 
II analyzes attempts to apply antitrust law to patent privateer-
ing against large companies and considers similar applications 
to patent privateering against small businesses. Part III rec-
ommends Congress, regulators, or the courts adopt a rebuttable 
 
Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with RAND-Encumbered Patents, 27 
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 209, 213 (2012) (discussing the debate).  
 17. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Pa-
tent Assertion Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (2014); Justin R. Orr, Note, Pa-
tent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 555–68 (2013). 
 18. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2171–72; Robert A. Mat-
thews, Jr., Antitrust Claims Against Patent Assertion Entities, 5 ANNOTATED 
PATENT DIGEST § 34:54.50 (2016); Orr, supra note 17. 
 19. For example, a bill directed specifically at patent trolls failed to make 
it out of committee in 2014. Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Con-
gress, ARS TECHNICA (May 23, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2014/05/how-the-patent-trolls-won-in-congress.  
 20. See Susan E. Foster, Intellectual Property Antitrust: The Pendulum 
Swings, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 93 (2013); Matthew J. 
Reilly, Trending Issues in Antitrust Law and Practice Tips on Avoiding and 
Responding to Antitrust Investigations, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-
TRUST LAW, supra, at 79; Orr, supra note 17. 
 21. See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 461, 464–66 (2014). 
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presumption of antitrust liability and explains why other pro-
posals would inadequately address patent privateering. This 
solution will counteract the practical difficulties faced by small 
businesses when sued by patent privateers and the related an-
ticompetitive market effects. 
I.  PRIVATEERING, PATENTS, AND ANTITRUST LAW   
This Part surveys patent privateering: its history, struc-
ture, strategy, effects, and the applicable law. It begins by re-
viewing relevant U.S. patent law in Section A. Section B then 
offers an explanation of how patent privateering is conducted, 
along with a discussion of why it is popular and its effects. 
Lastly, Section C briefly explains relevant antitrust law.  
A. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 
Patent holders have the right to exclude all others from 
“making, using, or selling in the United States the invention 
claimed by the patent for twenty years.”22 Most scholars agree 
that patent rights benefit society at large by incentivizing R&D 
and invention.23 Patents do this by enabling patent-holding in-
ventors to recoup costs and profit from invention, encouraging 
the sharing of inventions and licensing to others, and reducing 
wasteful, duplicative R&D.24 In this way, patent grants are cru-
cial elements in a competitive system because they encourage 
competition between inventors to create and innovate.25 In es-
sence, patents form an essential part of the competitive eco-
nomic landscape in the United States.  
Patent rights are enforced through litigation,26 and in the 
past decade, patent infringement suits have increased dramati-
 
 22. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BAL-
ANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (2003) [hereinafter 
FTC REPORT]. 
 23. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS: 
A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1–2 (2008). 
 24. Id.  
 25. E.g., William Wynne, Patent Wars, Trolls, and Privateers: Killing In-
novation, Death by 1,000 Lawsuits, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2013). 
 26. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . 
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States . . . . for a term beginning on the date 
on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed . . . .”); id. § 271 (defining infringement and 
creating a cause of action for infringement).  
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cally.27 There are a variety of reasons for this increase, one of 
which is product complexity. Advanced tech products rely on 
thousands of patents at once; for example, a typical smartphone 
may involve as many as 250,000 different patents.28 It is there-
fore easy for a smartphone manufacturer to infringe on at least 
one patent, perhaps inadvertently. Additionally, companies are 
constantly developing new patents based on past patented in-
ventions, leading to overlapping patent rights and increasing 
the likelihood of infringement.29 This may also be a byproduct of 
over-issuance of patents.30  
Some competitors intend to use patent rights competitively 
and patent litigation as a competitive tactic.31 This form of 
predatory patent litigation is most common in industries built 
primarily on intellectual property capital (e.g., high-tech indus-
tries), where the innovation is incremental and patents overlap 
and are interchangeable.32 Firms engaging in predatory litiga-
 
 27. See Amy G. O’Toole, Recent Governmental Initiatives and Findings 
Addressing NPE Litigation—Are There Any Judicial Solutions?, in NON-
PRACTING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 2013: PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE PER-
SPECTIVES 67 (R. David Donoghue ed., 2013). In recent years, patent litigation 
has abated, however. Richard Lloyd, The Number of Litigants in US Patent 
Suits Drops to Lowest Level Since 2009, IAM (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.iam 
-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=7eed4cea-1687-4769-87e3-caee8fcb8c74; see al-
so Wynne, supra note 25, at 1016. 
 28. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1017–18. Of note, commentators estimate 
that patent royalties paid by smartphone manufacturers may exceed $120 for 
every device. See Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering—Patents as Weapons, 
CTR. FOR POL’Y STUDIES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/ 
2014/10/28/patent-privateering-patents-as-weapons.  
 29. The Doctrine of Equivalents is intended to address this problem. Rela-
tionship to the Doctrine of Equivalents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2186.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2016). 
 30. See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence 
from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 676 (2015) (“Our results sug-
gest that the inability of the PTO to finally rid itself of an application biases it 
toward granting patents.”). 
 31. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narra-
tives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1571, 1587–88 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-
Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (2003); 
Charles Duan, Big Businesses Are Filing Frivolous Patent Lawsuits To Stifle 
Innovative Small Competitors, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/realspin/2014/02/24/big-businesses-are-filing-frivolous-patent 
-lawsuits-to-stifle-innovative-small-competitors. 
 32. See Chien, supra note 31, at 1589; see also Ewing, supra note 11, at 30 
(stating that privateering is more prevalent in industries where patents are 
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tion tactics tend to target “less financially-established defend-
ants” (usually small or new competitors), a combination that 
epitomizes a David vs. Goliath scenario.33  
B. PATENT PRIVATEERING: THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE,  
HOW, AND WHY 
Recall that patent privateering involves concerted activity 
between a PAE and a sponsor company.34 This Section explores 
the history of patent privateering, PAE activities, the priva-
teering relationship, why privateering is popular, and the gen-
eral effects of PAE activities.  
1. Use of PAEs in Patent Privateering 
Regulators first recognized PAEs as early as 2003.35 By 
2006, PAEs gained the attention of the Supreme Court, raising 
their national profile and spurring debate.36 Since then, the 
number of PAEs and suits brought by them has increased dra-
matically.37 Each branch of the federal government and many 
state governments are investigating PAE business models.38 
Nevertheless, most information about PAE ownership and ac-
tivities remains unknown.39 And the state and federal govern-
ments have only attempted to address small parts of the prob-
lem.40 
 
interchangeable because this makes it easier for the privateer to assert in-
fringement with some apparent validity). 
 33. See Chien, supra note 31, at 1592.  
 34. See supra p. 2168.  
 35. See FTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 38–39. Scholars suggest that PAEs 
first popped up much earlier, though with less prominence. See Tom Ewing & 
Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15–16.  
 36. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 37. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2123; Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Patent Assertion Entity Work-
shop 3 (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/  
public_events/patent-assertion-entity-activities-workshop/121210paeworkshop 
.pdf. 
 38. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 66.  
 39. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 3–4. 
 40. Efforts so far have mostly addressed patent trolls threatening litiga-
tion against thousands of small businesses at once. See FTC Settlement Bars 
Patent Assertion Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc 
-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive (stating that the 
number of letters sent by the PAE was over 9,000); Pamela M. Prah, State AGs 
Target Patent Trolls To Protect Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2013), http:// 
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Many PAEs are sponsored and operate for the benefit of 
others.41 Universities, individual inventors, and technology de-
velopment companies that do not practice their patents may 
engage in PAE sponsorship to protect their patent rights.42 But 
major Fortune 500 companies and even sovereign nations use 
PAEs not only to protect patents and generate royalties from 
infringers, but also for competitive purposes.43 For them, the 
competitive interests involved in harassing a rival or perceived 
corporate threat overshadows any economic interests.44 Their 
PAEs litigate hundreds of patent infringement lawsuits against 
rivals and threats to their own economies.45 It is thus perhaps 
unsurprising that PAEs bring more than 60% of U.S. patent lit-
igation.46  
The rise in patent privateering, which involves PAEs, has 
been controversial because it carries the potential of anticom-
petitive abuse.47 In particular, regulators worry about PAE in-
 
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/25/state-ag-patent-trolls/ 
3696889.  
 41. See Ewing, supra note 11. 
 42. See id. at 6; see also Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 666–70 (2014) (discussing the 
different kinds of patent holding companies); Ewing, supra note 11, at 25 (dis-
cussing the same); David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate 
America, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/ 
business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html. 
 43. Ewing, supra note 11, at 3, 30–31; Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, 
at 6; Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, RE-
CORDER, July 30, 2001, at 3–6, https://perma-archives.org/ware/XPX8 
-JU9T/id_/file:/XPX8-JU9T/cap.pdf; Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, What the U.S. Can 
Learn from the EU’s Patent Mistakes, FORBES (June 8, 2015), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/06/08/what-the-u-s-can-learn-from-the-eus 
-patent-mistakes; Jeff J. Roberts, Google and Microsoft’s Patent Peace: 3 Unre-
solved Questions, FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/01/ 
google-microsoft-patent-analysis. 
 44. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 6. 
 45. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION 1 (2013), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo37258/patent-report 
.pdf (reporting that PAEs threatened over 100,000 companies in 2012 and that 
the number is rising); Colleen Chien, Presentation in the Patent Entity Activi-
ties Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/pae. 
 46. Leslie A. Gordon, “Patent Privateers” Do Legal Legwork for Big-Time 
Tech Companies, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/ 
mag_article/small_companies_pick_up_the_cost_of_patent_privateering_ 
litigation. This number continues to rise. See Stefani E. Shanberg & Joshua A. 
Baskin, NPEs in the ITC, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 
2013, supra note 27, at 51; Chien, supra note 45; Stephanie Mlot, Google Pro-
gram Fights Patent Trolls, Aids Start-ups, PCMAG (July 24, 2015), http:// 
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2488392,00.asp (reporting 68%).  
 47. See Gordon, supra note 46. 
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volvement in the healthcare and technology industries because 
these sectors are economically substantial, implicate many pa-
tent rights, and have historically “been subject to a great deal 
of antitrust enforcement activity due to . . . alleged use of pa-
tents to exclude or limit competition.”48 Yet, no federal agency 
has taken any steps to break the swell. 
2. Privateering’s Core Activities: Aggregation and Litigation 
Privateering comprises two core activities: the aggregation 
and litigation of patents. Aggregation is the amassing of “vast 
treasuries of patents” and forming a patent arsenal.49 The ag-
gregation of thousands of patents shifts the focus from the val-
ue of one patent to the size and diversity of a portfolio, which 
can be wielded like a club and pose a substantial threat to liti-
gation targets facing hundreds of infringement allegations at 
once from a single PAE.50 But this is not to say that the patents 
held by mass aggregators are always weak;51 some are strong, 
making the threat of the club more intimidating and the seri-
ousness of the suit hard to predict.52 This club can be “life 
threatening” when brandished against startups and small com-
panies.53 
The relative threat of a patent infringement lawsuit de-
pends on the size of the PAE’s patent arsenal.54 A larger patent 
arsenal enables a PAE to assert more infringement claims 
against a single target or against multiple targets and do so 
more credibly.55 Either approach often results in nudging rivals 
into less favorable competitive positions56 because the high cost 
 
 48. Reilly, supra note 20, at 85. 
 49. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 1. 
 50. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2153; Orr, supra note 17, at 
538. 
 51. See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Re-
peat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 681 (2011).  
 52. See David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 51, 58 (2014). 
 53. See id. (stating that “mass patent aggregators may be vehicles that 
favor established players over upstarts”). 
 54. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 11, at 34–35; Wynne, supra note 25, at 
1024–25. 
 55. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra 
note 16, at 18. 
 56. Ewing, supra note 11. A less favorable position may mean market ex-
clusion or increased costs through payment of settlement royalties, making 
the targets less competitive. Id. 
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of defending a suit incentivizes settlement or exit from the in-
dustry.57 
Both litigation and aggregation have been wildly successful 
strategies for sponsor companies, padding the bottom line with 
additional revenue, while eliminating other patent litigation 
risks such as infringement counter-suits (since the PAE does 
not practice any patents) and reputation costs (with customers, 
shareholders, partners, or standard-setting entities).58 Secrecy 
also eliminates the risk of responses by regulators.59 Since there 
are very few consequences, more and more large companies 
have seen patent privateering as a way to generate new and 
additional revenue or gain competitive benefits in the wake of 
the 2008 Great Recession.60 As a result, these activities are in-
creasing in volume, frequency, and aggressiveness.61  
3. How Sponsor Companies Structure a Privateering  
Relationship 
There are at least three common types of patent privateer-
ing relationships. Public disclosure is a sponsor’s greatest po-
tential liability, so any privateering arrangement must be 
stealthy.62 Secrecy limits a rival’s ability to retaliate against the 
 
 57. See Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier Foundation as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 17, Altera Corp. v. Papst Licensing 
GmbH & Co. KG, Nos. 15-1914, 15-1919 (Fed. Cir. 2015), https://www 
.eff.org/files/2015/12/21/brief-altera-v-papst.pdf (“[Small companies] are . . . the 
ones most likely to succumb to undue settlement pressure . . . .”). Note also 
that the average cost of patent litigation involving a PAE is about $980,000 
through the end of discovery and $1.75 million or more through trial. R. David 
Donoghue et al., Fighting Smarter Against NPEs, in NON-PRACTICING ENTI-
TIES PATENT LITIGATION 2013, supra note 27, at 202; see also Wynne, supra 
note 25, at 1022. 
 58. See, e.g., Anti-Competitive Effects: Litigation & Extortion, PATENT 
PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/systemic-problems/anticompetitive 
-effects-litigation-extortion (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Jason Rantanen, Guest 
Post on Using the Antitrust Laws To Police Patent Privateering, PATENTLY-O 
(June 3, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/guest-post-on-using-the 
-antitrust-laws-to-police-patent-privateering.html; see also Popofsky & 
Laufert, supra note 15, at 4.  
 59. For example, the Department of Justice would not be able to discern a 
pattern of predatory litigation by a market leader and bring criminal charges 
under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.  
 60. See McClure, supra note 14.  
 61. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 53; The Patent Troll Problem, LOT 
NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/the-patent-troll-problem (last visited Apr. 4, 
2016). 
 62. Cf. Ewing, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining that “a sponsor’s goals for a 
privateering operation are often defeated by public exposure” and that 
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sponsor with counterclaims for patent infringement or anti-
trust violations, harm the sponsor’s reputation, complain to 
regulators about a larger competitor’s predatory conduct, or re-
spond to lawsuits in a more calculated way.63  
First, a sponsor company may license one of its patents to a 
PAE.64 Through the licensing agreement, the PAE is granted 
the exclusive right to assert the patent against infringers and 
litigate the patent in court. The licensing agreement may also 
provide the sponsor with some control over the PAE’s patent in-
fringement lawsuits.65 But unlike other relationships, here 
sponsor secrecy can be disclosed via discovery.66 In some cases, 
licensing may also limit a PAE’s standing to bring suit.67 
Second, a sponsor company may contract with a PAE in the 
hopes of compelling the PAE to use its own patents to sue the 
sponsor’s rivals.68 A sponsor could also invest in the PAE.69 In 
such cases, the sponsor may be able to obtain greater secrecy 
since no patent assertion contract would exist, and the sponsor 
would exercise control over the PAE as a private part-owner.70  
Third, and the most likely, the sponsor company could as-
sign its patents to a PAE, but retain a license for practicing the 
patent.71 The assignor-sponsor could also contract for the ability 
to direct assertions against rivals72 or hold ownership in the 
PAE.73 Because patent assignments are not required to be rec-
orded, the secrecy of a privateering arrangement can be main-
 
“[c]onsequently, the sponsor typically makes every effort to hide its involve-
ment in a privateering option”). 
 63. Id. at 9. 
 64. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2139 (“[C]ompanies rarely 
sell their ‘crown jewels’—patents that they need to prevent copying of technol-
ogies they consider critical . . . .”). 
 65. See, e.g., Wynne, supra note 25, at 1026. The license may instead 
simply provide guiding principles for how to choose a litigation target. See 
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2138. 
 66. See Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 775, 835 (2015); Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 460. 
 67. See Max Grant & Kieran Dickinson, Cases on Standing Hold Lessons 
for Patent Privateers and Defendants, MANAGING IP, Oct. 2013, at 22, 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/standing-lessons-for-privateers-and 
-defendants.  
 68. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 5–6, 33. 
 69. Id. at 73.  
 70. See id.; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2138. 
 71. See Orr, supra note 17, at 541. 
 72. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra 
note 16, at 20. 
 73. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
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tained.74 While this arrangement may provide the sponsor with 
significant control, secrecy could be compromised if the corpo-
rate veil is pierced.75 Evidence suggests this arrangement is 
most common.76  
Due to the desire for secrecy, either the second or third 
type of relationship is both popular and effective in securing 
the anticompetitive effects of patent privateering.  
4. Privateering’s Advantages for Sponsors and Negative  
Effects for Everyone Else 
The significant incentives for sponsors to engage in priva-
teering have undoubtedly propelled privateering’s growth in re-
cent years. Privateering offers litigation cost savings to spon-
sors,77 may result in the receipt of larger settlements and 
judgment awards,78 and enables the sponsor company to focus 
on its actual business.79 Beyond financial benefits, patent priva-
teering also reduces reputational losses and other consequences 
from suing competitors,80 allows sponsors to secretly bombard 
 
 74. See, e.g., Susan G.L. Glovsky, Guest Post: It’s Time for a Reliable Sys-
tem To Determine Who Owns a U.S. Patent, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/patent-recordation.html (remarking that 
“defendants in a lawsuit may have to take it on faith that the seller, licensor, 
borrower, or plaintiff truly owns” the patent-in-suit). When patent assign-
ments are recorded, they can be viewed online. See Assignment Search, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignment.uspto.gov (last visited Apr. 
4, 2016).  
 75. See Gordon, supra note 46. However, PAEs can create shell companies 
to create further layers of secrecy to slim the risks of piercing. See Wynne, su-
pra note 25, at 1032–33; see also David Balto & Matthew Lane, Abstract for 
The Patent Privateering Iceberg (Feb. 7–8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://law.scu.edu/hightech/wipip2014 (“NPEs often employ a complicated 
ownership structure consistent of many shell companies to hide patent owner-
ship.”).  
 76. “Sales to PAEs and other non-practicing entities represent 75 per cent 
of all patent transactions.” Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 2. 
 77. See id. at 4; cf. PATENT LITIGATION: LITIGATING AGAINST A NON-
PRACTICING ENTITY, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 5-553-7946 (2016) [here-
inafter PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE] (stating that PAEs often sue us-
ing largely the same counsel, experts, and evidence); Economists’ Roundtable 
on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 19; Chien, supra note 
45 (stating that most PAEs litigate on contingency and have attorneys well-
versed in patent litigation). 
 78. See PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77. 
 79. Orr, supra note 17, at 541; see Gordon, supra note 46 (stating that few 
companies can successfully manage commercializing patents and running 
their core business operations). 
 80. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra 
note 16, at 19; see Ewing, supra note 11, at 6–7; Schwartz, supra note 52, at 
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rivals,81 helps achieve competitive results,82 and reduces the 
risk of antitrust violations (due to the secrecy of the sponsor’s 
identity).83 It also allows large competitors to “control the loca-
tion the case will be heard” as well as to gain various jurisdic-
tional advantages.84  
Privateering has also thrived in the current patent envi-
ronment, which entails the under-utilization and under-
capitalization of patents,85 a proliferation of weak and overly-
broad patents,86 increased outsourcing of functions by corporate 
America,87 high patent litigation costs,88 the ability to easily en-
gage in opportunistic litigation and secure favorable settle-
ments,89 a large patent marketplace for purchasing patent 
rights,90 legal uncertainty regarding the merit of infringement 
accusations,91 and prohibitive costs in amassing large, defensive 
patent arsenals.92  
 
53; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1021. 
 81. See generally Ewing, supra note 11 (discussing how sponsors use 
PAEs to stifle competitors). 
 82. Id. at 31, 46 (stating that PAEs can more credibly threaten to sue for 
patent infringement); see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2139–46. 
 83. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032–33. 
 84. See Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier Foundation as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 57, at 15–18. 
 85. Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra 
note 16, at 11; Steven Seidenberg, Should Your Company Enlist Patent Priva-
teers?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/ 
02/26/should-your-company-enlist-patent-privateers. 
 86. MATSUURA, supra note 23, at 23; see Economists’ Roundtable on Hot 
Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16. 
 87. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 14; see also Lemley & Melamed, supra 
note 10, at 2165–66 (stating that there is an “everyone does it” attitude with 
privateering); Seidenberg, supra note 85.  
 88. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 31, at 1584; Seidenberg, supra note 85.  
 89. See John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Histori-
cal Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 590–91 (2013). 
 90. Meurer, supra note 31, at 519–20. 
 91. See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Nokia and Ericsson Seek To Justify Their 
Privateering Ways, Defend Patent Transfers to NPEs, FOSS PATENTS (May 21, 
2005), http://fosspatents.com/2015/05/nokia-and-ericsson-seek-to-justify.html 
(“Smartphone patent assertions are so vastly unsuccessful that I’ve arrived at 
the conclusion that the term ‘intellectual property’ is a propagandistic misno-
mer . . . . [W]hen the vast majority of assertions turn out meritless . . . transac-
tion costs are totally out of proportion . . . .”).  
 92. See, e.g., Schrepel, supra note 28 (discussing briefly the mutually as-
sured destruction theory of patent ownership); see also Chien, supra note 31, 
at 1584–85 (discussing the complications, risks, and expenses of patent litiga-
tion between large companies). 
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Nevertheless, privateering may face some disadvantages. 
For example, judges and juries tend to view PAE claims un-
sympathetically.93 Further, the possibility of obtaining an in-
junction against a target is smaller since PAEs do not practice 
the patents-in-suit.94 A PAE also cannot obtain damages for lost 
profits that the sponsoring company might otherwise collect.95 
However, since privateering is not primarily purposed on col-
lecting royalties or enjoining alleged infringement, experts pre-
dict privateering will become even more widespread in the fu-
ture.96 And it is not so much the likelihood of success on the 
merits, but instead the high likelihood of forcing a defendant to 
settle out of court that enables this litigation model.97  
Most criticisms of patent privateering relate to the effect 
patent privateering has on other actors in the patent system. 
For example, patent privateering interferes with innovation by 
increasing litigation costs to inventors,98 forcing competitors to 
withdraw from the market,99 facilitating bully-like behavior 
among actors in the patent system,100 taxing “business, invest-
ment, growth and opportunity,”101 and encouraging settlement 
 
 93. PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Seidenberg, supra note 85 (“It lowers companies’ risk and puts the 
burden of enforcement on others. I don’t see why this [trend] would stop.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthew Rappaport, managing di-
rector of patent analytics company IP Checkups)). 
 97. See infra Part II.A. 
 98. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10; Lemley & 
Melamed, supra note 10, at 2118; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1009. 
 99. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032. Startups may be forced to quit quickly 
after they begin. David Goldman, Patent Troll: “I’m Ethical and Moral,” CNN 
MONEY (July 2, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/02/technology/enterprise/ 
patent-troll; Gordon, supra note 46.  
 100. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 64. 
 101. Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining Deceptive Prac-
tices by Patent Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 
113th Cong. 11 (2013) (statement of Jon Potter, President, Application Devel-
opers Alliance), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86955.pdf [here-
inafter Demand Letters—Senate]; see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 45, at 9; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 10, at 2119; Meurer, supra note 
31, at 519; see also JORGE LEMUS & EMIL TEMNYALOV, OUTSOURCING PATENT 
ENFORCEMENT: THE EFFECT OF “PATENT PRIVATEERS” ON LITIGATION AND 
R&D INVESTMENTS 37 (2014), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/ 
download.cgi?db_name=llOC2015&paper_id=134 (discussing how PAE activity 
disincentivizes investment in research and development).  
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of meritless patent claims.102 On the competitive and economic 
end, patent privateering unfairly harms rivals by scaring off 
customers and suppliers with threats of litigation,103 removing 
high transaction costs that discourage nuisance litigation,104 
engendering a norm of businesses suing each other indirectly 
and the formation of invest-to-sue entities,105 enabling a com-
petitor to indirectly affect a rival’s valuation,106 reducing incen-
tives for competitors to engage in cross-licensing truces (which 
are socially efficient),107 raising rivals’ costs,108 and providing a 
method for companies involved in standard-setting to potential-
ly evade fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) li-
censing commitments.109 Patent privateering reportedly costs 
the U.S. economy around $29 billion each year, the costs of 
which often “falls squarely on the shoulders of the consumer.”110  
5. Proposals To Address Privateering 
Given the general effects of patent privateering noted 
above, policy-makers have called for legal reforms.111 Most have 
proposed rules designed to lift the veil concealing the identity of 
 
 102. Donoghue et al., supra note 57, at 201; Wynne, supra note 25, at 1022 
(citations omitted); see also The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 61 (stating 
that fewer than 1% of suits are found to have infringed a valid patent). 
 103. Wynne, supra note 25, at 1032. Demand letters are even being sent to 
frighten consumers. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 2–3 
(statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill, Chairman). 
 104. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 23. 
 105. Gordon, supra note 46. 
 106. Id. 
 107. IAIN M. COCKBURN, PRESENTATION ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
POTENTIAL COSTS AT THE FTC/DOJ WORKSHOP 6 (Dec. 10, 2012), http:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/patent-assertion 
-entity-activities-workshop/icockburn.pdf; LEMUS & TEMNYALOV, supra note 
101. 
 108. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 456–57.  
 109. See id.; Schrepel, supra note 28 (“[Evading FRAND commitments] is 
one of the most harmful side effects of patent privateering.”).  
 110. Keith Farrell, The Harmful Practice of Patent Privateering, 
TOWNHALL (Oct. 20, 2014), http://townhall.com/columnists/keithfarrell/2014/ 
10/20/the-harmful-practice-of-patent-privateering-n1906666/page/full. Other 
sources corroborate costs in the $20–30 billion range. Some, however, put the 
number around $15 billion. See LAUREN COHEN ET AL., EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
ON THE BEHAVIOR AND IMPACT OF PATENT TROLLS: A SURVEY 20–21 (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2708224. Regardless, the 
costs are substantial and increasing over time.  
 111. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 68. See generally Golden, supra note 89, 
at 600–17 (discussing a variety of suggestions for how to reduce the harmful 
effects of patent privateering). 
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the sponsor company. For example, one proposal argues for a 
rule requiring all parties to a lawsuit to list all persons with an 
interest in the outcome of a case.112 Other ideas increase sanc-
tions or provide fee-shifting for unjustified, vexatious, or bad 
faith litigation.113 Some proposals suggest amending patent 
laws to require notice to the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) of any assignment or sale of patents114 
and increase the plaintiff’s burden to show infringement.115 
Lastly, some argue for outlawing patent privateering altogeth-
er—a perhaps unrealistic goal.116  
Most recently, the private sector has attempted to address 
patent privateering by providing startups with patent rights 
free of charge in an effort to bring them within Google’s realm 
of litigation protection.117 Google has also engaged in several 
large cross-licensing deals with other major technology compa-
nies as a preemptive measure to protect itself from patent pri-
vateering at the hands of its peers.118 However, Google’s pro-
gram is unlikely to solve the patent privateering problem 
generally.119 Finally, some commentators have expressed opti-
mism that antitrust law counterclaims or defenses are availa-
 
 112. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 120–21; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70–72 
(citing H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. and S. 1013, 113th Cong.) (discussing the 
America Invents Act). 
 113. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 123; see also O’Toole, supra note 27, at 
68–71 (citing, inter alia, H.R. 845, 113th Cong.) (discussing the America In-
vents Act and SHIELD Act). 
 114. O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70 (citing H.R. 2024, 113th Cong.). 
 115. See Economists’ Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, 
supra note 16, at 18. 
 116. See Golden, supra note 89, at 602. Banning privateering might be ef-
fective: an international ban on privateering was a major reason why the prac-
tice eventually died out on the high seas. See JANE MARTIN LEMNITZER, POW-
ER, LAW AND THE END OF PRIVATEERING 174–75 (2014) (discussing the 
abolition of maritime privateering via the Declaration of Paris). But see Star 
Trek: Deep Space Nine: To the Death (Paramount television broadcast May 13, 
1996) (predicting the use of privateering on the final frontier: space). 
 117. Mlot, supra note 46.  
 118. Id.; see also Rubin Sfadj, How Patent Privateering Is Hurting the Pa-
tent System and the Innovation Economy, CAPX (July 10, 2015), http:// 
www.capx.co/how-patent-privateering-is-hurting-the-patent-system-and-the 
-innovation-economy. However, Google has also been the target of a patent 
privateer called “Rockstar Consortium” sponsored by Apple, Microsoft, RIM, 
Sony, Ericsson, and EMC. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 756 (2015).  
 119. See generally Rice, supra note 118, at 773–74 (exploring defensive tac-
tics that may be used in the future, but stating that “[n]o single private action 
will cure the current patent system”). 
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ble to prevent and deter patent privateering.120 Scholars have 
considered whether antitrust law is applicable, with varying 
opinions.121  
C. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS 
United States antitrust law exhibits the fundamental be-
lief that free enterprise, open markets, and competition achieve 
an optimal economic system.122 The Sherman Act buttresses 
this belief not only by imposing criminal liability on violators, 
but also providing for treble damages.123 It also seeks to pro-
mote and protect competition by ensuring the process of compe-
tition remains fair.124  
Antitrust law does not protect competitors from other com-
petitors. Rather, it prohibits competitor conduct that unjustifi-
ably forecloses competition and harms consumers.125 Because 
patent rights allow patent holders to exclude others from creat-
ing products based on a patented invention, the antitrust laws 
arguably conflict with the grants of power created by patent 
laws.126 Thus, policy-makers must determine the best balance 
between spurring innovation and protecting competition, 
though both can sometimes be achieved independently.127 With 
the onset of patent privateering, scholars have turned their at-
tention to evaluating whether or not competitors may legally 
use patent litigation to exclude rivals from participation in the 
market.128 
 
 120. Foster, supra note 20; Reilly, supra note 20; Orr, supra note 17. 
 121. E.g., Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17; infra notes 215–16.  
 122. FTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 1; see Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and 
Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 
310 (2014). 
 123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that any person violating the 
section is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine not exceeding $100,000,000, if 
a corporation). 
 124. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.2 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Lim, supra note 122. But see David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wol-
man, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 396 
(2003) (stating that patent and antitrust laws are complementary). 
 127. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 412; Economists’ Roundtable 
on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 19; see also In re 
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In-
tellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust 
laws.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 31, at 521. 
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There are several antitrust counterclaims and defenses 
that a targeted small business could assert in response to a suit 
by a patent privateer.129 The following subsections review pos-
sible relevant antitrust claims and defenses.  
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”130 Section 1 
exclusively concerns collective, concerted conduct and address-
es both horizontal (between competitors) and vertical (supply 
chain) arrangements.131 Section 1 only applies to agreements 
between independent entities, so parent companies are not lia-
ble under the act for arrangements with wholly-owned subsidi-
aries or those partially-owned, over which they have control.132  
Courts apply either a per se or rule of reason test for Sec-
tion 1 liability.133 Per se tests are only used when the agree-
ments in question are obviously anticompetitive, such as price-
fixing agreements.134 Conduct that is not per se illegal is evalu-
ated using the rule of reason test, which essentially requires 
the court to determine whether the conduct is more anticompet-
itive than pro-competitive.135 Courts primarily consider whether 
the conduct forecloses on competition or harms consumers—an 
interrelated analysis.136 
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
The second Section of the Sherman Antitrust Act states 
that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce” is guilty 
 
 129. See Carl W. Schwarz et al., The Intellectual Property/Antitrust Inter-
face, 7 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 15 (2000). 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 131. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 399; Josh Baskin, Competitive 
Regulation of Mobile Software Systems: Promoting Innovation Through Re-
form of Antitrust and Patent Laws, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1727, 1733 (2013). 
 132. See CHRISTOPHER J. MACAVOY, US ANTITRUST LAWS: OVERVIEW, 
PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 9-204-0472 (2014). 
 133. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 399. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.; see also Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule 
of Reason Not the Rule of Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 43–44 (2013) 
(discussing the intricacy of the test).  
 136. See Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 437. 
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of anticompetitive behavior.137 A company violates Section 2 if it 
attempts to acquire monopoly power in its market or willfully 
maintains its power in anticompetitive ways.138 Monopoly pow-
er is the ability “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”139 It can be shown when 
a company has the ability to directly affect rivals or has a mar-
ket share of at least 50%.140 Section 2 applies to both collective 
conduct and unilateral conduct.141  
Section 2 claims are somewhat unpredictable, as the law is 
“more than a little confused.”142 Generally speaking, there are 
two elements to a monopolization claim: (1) possession or at-
tempted possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; 
and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power 
through anticompetitive conduct, distinguishable from mere 
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.”143 Courts look to wheth-
er there exists a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power in attempted monopolization cases.144  
The Supreme Court has stated that predatory litigation 
and associated conduct “may be sufficient to prove the neces-
sary intent” for Section 2 claims.145 Exclusionary and predatory 
conduct in general can satisfy intent as well.146 This includes 
abuse of process, espionage or sabotage, patent abuses, and 
 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETI-
TION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm 
(reflecting the DOJ’s enforcement policy under Section 2 and synthesizing the 
views expressed at the DOJ and FTC hearings, in extensive scholarly com-
mentary, and in the jurisprudence relating to unilateral conduct under Section 
2). 
 138. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); Baskin, 
supra note 131. 
 139. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401. 
 140. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 501 F2d 80, 
82 (5th Cir. 1974); Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401. 
 142. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Constitutes “Attempt To Monopo-
lize,” Within Meaning of § 2 of Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2), 27 A.L.R. FED. 
762 (2015).  
 143. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 144. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); 
accord Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 145. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459. 
 146. See Chia, supra note 16, at 228. 
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vexatious or repetitive litigation.147 Meritless patent litigation 
exhibits the requisite conduct and intent to unlawfully attempt 
to monopolize.148 Outsourcing patent litigation in an effort to 
maintain or obtain monopoly power may even be sufficient.149 
In attempts to monopolize, establishing a dangerous prob-
ability of success often requires an analysis of the party’s like-
lihood of achieving monopoly power in a relevant market, in 
view of the party’s current market share and the barriers to 
achieving monopoly power.150 Merely holding a patent does not 
usually convey a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power.151 Additionally, highly competitive markets with low 
market shares and low barriers to entry “do not attract much 
antitrust concern.”152 Less competitive, highly centralized mar-
kets with high barriers to entry have more antitrust risk.153 
3. Handgards Sham Litigation  
Patent holders are generally immune from antitrust liabil-
ity unless they engage in meritless sham litigation or use a pa-
tent in some way to extend market power beyond the power 
granted by the patent.154 This exception is called Handgards 
sham litigation and is one of a handful of specific applications 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.155 
Under Noerr-Pennington immunity, all persons have a 
right to petition the government for grievances under the First 
Amendment, and this has been interpreted to apply to law-
 
 147. MACAVOY, supra note 132; Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, 
Attempted Monopolization: Reuniting a Doctrine Divorced from Its Criminal 
Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 360–61 
(1990); Schwarz et al., supra note 129; Chia, supra note 16. 
 148. Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; see infra Part I.C.3. 
 149. See Ram Menon & Kevin Spivak, Trends in Mobile and Consumer 
Electronics, 48 LES NOUVELLES 238, 239 (2013). 
 150. See David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counter-
claims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-
Litigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 102 (2001).  
 151. See id. 
 152. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 403–04. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 150, at 105.  
 155. See Baskin, supra note 131, at 1743. There are also other specific 
types of Section 2 claims, such as Walker Process claims. See generally Stein-
man & Fitzpatrick, supra note 150 (outlining the elements of Walker Process, 
Handgards or sham-litigation claims and explaining the grounds on which 
these claims may be attacked in motions to dismiss and/or at the summary 
judgment stage). However, these claims are not applicable unless the patents 
involved are invalid due to fraud. Id. 
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suits.156 However, no person may petition the government in 
meritless ways as a strategy to harm competitors and consum-
ers.157 Handgards claims reflect the understanding that patent 
holders may not use litigation as an illegitimate weapon in a 
concealed attempt to interfere with a competitor.158 This doc-
trine also establishes, however, that in order for a lawsuit to 
violate the antitrust laws, it must be a complete sham, focused 
not on the outcome of the case, but instead on the anticompeti-
tive results of the judicial process.  
4. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws acquisitions of assets 
(such as patents) where the effect of such transactions “may be 
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly in a relevant market.”159 This can be shown when acqui-
sition of patents allows the acquirer to exert monopoly power 
(similar to that defined in Section 2 claims) and substantially 
lessens competition within a relevant market.160  
5. The Affirmative Defense of Patent Misuse 
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a patent in-
fringement suit.161 The doctrine states that patent rights are 
privileges, not unconditional rights,162 which are abused when 
used to extend the patent’s exclusionary power beyond the 
scope of protection that is reasonably granted by the patent.163 
A defendant must prove that conduct not only extended the 
privilege beyond the scope of the patent, but also caused anti-
competitive injury.164 This injury can be shown by proving the 
patent was used in a way that violates antitrust laws or that 
the patent holder has engaged in some element of anticompeti-
 
 156. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 138–40 (1961); Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; Roszkowski & Brubaker, 
supra note 147, at 416. 
 157. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 
(1991); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 158. Schwarz et al., supra note 129. 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2014). 
 160. See John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Amisha R. Patel, Taming the Trolls: Why 
Antitrust Is Not a Viable Solution for Stopping Patent Assertion Entities, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2014). 
 161. Lim, supra note 122, at 308; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 79–80. 
 162. See Lim, supra note 122, at 318–19. 
 163. See Schwarz et al., supra note 129. 
 164. See id. 
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tive behavior, using its market power to force parties to act in 
ways they would not otherwise act in a competitive market.165 
Since it is a defense, patent misuse does not necessarily 
confer on the defendant a right to recover attorney’s fees.166 It 
does not even invalidate the offending patents—the misused 
patents are only unenforceable until the patent holder cures 
the misuse.167 Some have argued for a broader and “more ro-
bust” patent misuse doctrine that could invalidate patents fully 
in cases of clear antitrust wrongs.168 However, other scholars 
have argued that patent misuse duplicates antitrust laws and 
has a weak foundational justification.169  
II.  APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO PATENT 
PRIVATEERING   
This Part adds depth to the discussions of other commenta-
tors, who have previously addressed the general, broad effects 
of patent privateering, by specifically focusing on patent priva-
teering against small businesses. Section A analyzes how pa-
tent privateering affects small businesses, as opposed to large 
companies. Section B compares arguments put forth by other 
commentators on how to apply antitrust law to patent priva-
teering, exposing analytical holes and adding discussion for pa-
tent privateering against small businesses. 
A. THE EXACERBATED EFFECTS OF PATENT PRIVATEERING ON  
SMALL BUSINESSES 
Many of the anticompetitive effects associated with patent 
privateering170 apply with greater force to small businesses and 
small business rivals—the most common PAE target.171 This is 
primarily because small (and often new) businesses are the 
 
 165. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1351–52 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1184–86 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 
1341, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); O’Toole, supra note 27, 
at 80–81. 
 166. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 79–80. 
 167. Lim, supra note 122, at 309. 
 168. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 89, at 611. 
 169. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent 
Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 457, 488 (2011). 
 170. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 171. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10. But see Chien, 
supra note 31, at 1601 (showing that PAEs target the largest companies 40%, 
and new startups about 25%, of the time).  
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least likely to challenge patent infringement lawsuits brought 
by PAEs.172 Since entrepreneurs lack the time, resources, and 
sometimes even mental fortitude to address such lawsuits, they 
often are forced to settle before truly preparing a defense.173 Pa-
tent litigation can be “lethal” to small companies both logisti-
cally and financially.174 Defending a patent often requires hun-
dreds to thousands of hours of additional work and may cost 
more than $5 million.175 Therefore, when aimed at small busi-
nesses, privateering can be highly anticompetitive by (1) rais-
ing small rivals’ costs; (2) impeding small rivals’ ability to oper-
ate in or enter a market; and (3) foreclosing on competition in 
innovation. These effects on small businesses significantly risk 
their exclusion from the market—a result that is unlikely when 
patent privateering is targeted at large competitors.176  
1. Raising Small Rivals’ Costs 
First, when settlement terms are prohibitively expensive, 
small businesses may be forced to increase prices, withdraw 
from the market, or expend extremely limited resources on a 
legal fight.177 Unlike larger companies with considerable re-
serves and/or cash flow, small companies are ill-equipped to 
pay settlements or pursue expensive and lengthy litigation.178 
 
 172. E.g., Duan, supra note 31; see Brief of Public Knowledge & the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra 
note 57, at 17–18. 
 173. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 15 (statement of 
Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Chief Compli-
ance Officer, Cisco Systems, Inc.); Sean Patrick Butler, Dealing with NPEs: 
Views from a Startup GC, in NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION 
2013, supra note 27, at 35–36; Mike Masnick, Patent Trolls Causing Serious 
Problems for Startups, TECHDIRT (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20120915/01425620391/patent-trolls-causing-serious-problems 
-startups.shtml (describing the emotional impact of PAE patent litigation). 
 174. The Patent Troll Problem, supra note 61. 
 175. Meaghan Hemmings Kent et al., 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Pa-
tent Litigation Should Consider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ (Apr. 26, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+Reasons+Every+ 
Defendant+in+Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review. 
 176. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10. 
 177. Indeed, one of the most common reasons a small business fails is in-
sufficient capital, which may be siphoned away by legal fees. See Patricia 
Schaeger, The Seven Pitfalls of Business Failure and How To Avoid Them, 
BUSINESSKNOWHOW, http://www.businessknowhow.com/startup/business 
-failure.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 178. Duan, supra note 31 (“Big companies like Cisco have $13 million to 
battle these tactics and obtain justice. Little startups, small businesses, and 
solo entrepreneurs do not.”).  
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In addition to the disproportionate ability of small businesses 
to defend themselves, the legal costs to defend a suit can be 
disproportionately greater for small businesses than for larger 
companies as well.179 Even if the lawsuit shows only slight or 
even no merit, it is usually cheaper for small businesses to set-
tle.180 Thus, it is no wonder that some commentators have 
called patent litigation “the true sport of kings,”181 and PAE pa-
tent litigation against small companies “silent extortion.”182  
Since small businesses are more likely to settle patent in-
fringement lawsuits,183 they usually must pass on the cost of 
any settlements to consumers.184 The increased costs of prod-
 
 179. See Lloyd Dixon et al., The Impact of Regulation and Litigation on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship: An Overview 20 (Kauffman-RAND Ctr. 
for the Study of Small Bus. and Reg., Working Paper No. 317-ICJ, 2006), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAND_ 
WR317.pdf; see also Brief of Public Knowledge & the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 57, at 17 
(“[Small companies] are the ones least able to secure distant counsel, travel to 
a distant forum, and learn the procedures of a new jurisdiction.”); Xun Liu, 
Note, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions 
Away from Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 494 
(2013) (“[S]mall businesses suffer greater direct impact from patent lawsuits 
because they pay more litigation costs relative to their size.”).  
 180. See Dixon et al., supra note 179, at 42; Chien, supra note 21, at 467–
68; Joff Wild, It Is Time To Talk About the Patent Ogres, IAM (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=dba41734-acfa-4759-93fc 
-26fcb2c0b98a. 
 181. Hixon, supra note 4. Some have also described the situation faced by 
privateer’s targets as “giv[ing] up their gold and treasure, walk[ing] the plank 
or be[ing] put to the sword.” Tim Sparapani, Attack of the Patent Privateers, 
FORBES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/09/02/ 
attack-of-the-patent-privateers/#2f574bfe2184.  
 182. Paul Muschick, Feds Crack Down on Patent Trolling, MORNING CALL 
(Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-patent-trolls-mphj 
-watchdog-20141227-column.html (quoting Pennsylvania Attorney General 
Kathleen Kane).  
 183. Again, this is primarily because small businesses are unwilling to 
“walk . . . the plank and tak[e] their chances while their business is under at-
tack.” Sparapani, supra note 181.  
 184. Indeed, most businesses find this is necessary unless they hold sub-
stantial reserves. See generally Raphael Auer & Thomas Chaney, Exchange 
Rate Pass-Through in a Competitive Model of Pricing-to-Market, 41 J. MONEY 
CREDIT & BANKING 151 (2009) (developing a model of pricing-to-market pass-
through under perfect competition and flexible prices); Michael B. Devereaux 
& James Yetman, Price Adjustment and Exchange Rate Pass-Through, 29 J. 
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 181 (2010) (describing a theoretical model that would ac-
count for the determinants of exchange rate pass-through to consumer price); 
Aaron Huff, Reality-Based Pricing, 166 COMM. CARRIER J. 26 (2009) (discuss-
ing how commercial carriers are using mapping software and GPS technology 
to more efficiently track their mileage so as to keep down the cost pass-
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ucts and services offered by small rivals subsequently render 
them less competitive than large sponsor companies.185 Further, 
because small companies often settle in the face of threats of 
PAE litigation, there is greater possibility that royalties in ex-
cess of the value of the patents allegedly infringed upon will be 
gathered.186 This does not happen as often when larger compa-
nies are sued due to their willingness and ability to defend.187 
In fact, most large companies are not the targets of patent pri-
vateering in the first place.188  
Finally, some PAEs target whole swathes of small business 
rivals at once.189 Sometimes small businesses ignore demand 
letters, but many settle.190 Thus, as a group, hundreds to thou-
sands of small businesses operating in an industry and compet-
ing with a more-dominant firm can suffer increased costs and 
the host of other detrimental effects. Thus, patent privateering 
can enable a large company to raise tens to hundreds of rivals’ 
costs very efficiently. 
 
through); John B. Taylor, Low Inflation, Pass-Through, and the Pricing Power 
of Firms, 44 EURO. ECON. REV. 1389 (2000) (arguing that the decline of pass-
through is due to the low inflation environment that has recently been 
achieved in many countries).  
 185. Cf. Jagmohan Raju & Z. John Zhang, Introduction to Smart Pricing: 
How Google, Priceline, and Leading Businesses Use Pricing Innovation for 
Profitability, FT PRESS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article 
.aspx?p=1569334&seqNum=2 (explaining competition-based pricing).  
 186. See Symposium, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 395 
(2014). Some have attributed this to the nuisance or “holdup” value of a pa-
tent. See Chien, supra note 21, at 472–74; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, 
at 2; see also Ewing, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that litigation tools such as 
PAEs can extract greater value from patent rights). 
 187. See Richard Lloyd, Unwired Planet CEO Praises Judge’s Technical 
Knowledge After Major UK Court Win Against Samsung and Huawei, IAM 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=232cb69d 
-0343-4646-822c-c8b2a59066fc (reporting that Samsung and Huawei fought a 
patent privateer sponsored by Ericsson).  
 188. E.g., supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 189. E.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (stating that 8,000 demand letters were sent to small 
businesses and end-users alleging patent infringement, but only twenty-six 
were actually litigated, in this case); FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion 
Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics, supra note 40 (stating that a PAE sent 
out 4,800 demand letters, but none went to trial). 
 190. Chien, supra note 21, at 472 (stating that 22% of all companies do 
nothing in response to a demand letter, 35% fought the demand in some way, 
9% changed their products or business, 17% chose other actions, and 18% au-
tomatically settled).  
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2. Impeding Small Rivals’ Ability To Operate in or Enter a  
Market 
Threats of litigation can also substantially impede a 
startup’s ability to attract and keep customers and raise 
funds.191 In 2012, 40% of PAE-targeted small companies report-
ed a significant operational impact (such as a change in busi-
ness, exit from the market, delay in milestone, change in prod-
uct, etc.) as a result of a demand letter or an actual lawsuit 
brought by a PAE.192 About 13% of these small and startup 
companies exited their business or had to pivot their business 
strategy, and about 4% suffered fundraising impact.193 When 
small businesses are forced to change their offerings, raise 
prices, or exit the markets, this affects consumers by reducing 
choice and availability.  
Patent litigation can also exacerbate barriers to entry for 
small companies, reducing competition and raising the cost of 
production.194 For example, a new entrant in an industry will 
face greater startup costs if sued by multiple incumbents as 
soon as entering. If an industry is known for such tactics, it is 
usually less attractive to entrepreneurs and investors.195 In fact, 
patent privateering is inversely related to venture capital in-
vestment.196 Large companies often do not need to worry about 
fundraising activities with investors.197 
 
 191. See Demand Letters—Senate, supra note 101, at 13 (statement of 
Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, and Chief Compliance 
Officer, Cisco Systems, Inc.); Sparapani, supra note 181 (“[Startups] may get 
stabbed to death and choose to terminate their business entirely to end impov-
erishing litigation and avoid bogus infringement claims.”). For example, a 
four-employee startup that held a highly-ranked app on iTunes was forced to 
gut its app in response to a demand letter for royalties and removed features 
that customers liked. Id. at 11. The app is no longer successful, and the com-
pany is failing. Id. 
 192. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at 10.  
 193. Id. at 11. 
 194. Reilly, supra note 20, at 79; Dixon et al., supra note 179, at 20. 
 195. See Chien, supra note 21, at 474–76.  
 196. Kiebzak et al., supra note 11 (stating that venture capital investment 
would have been at least $8.1 billion higher over the course of a five year peri-
od but for frequent PAE litigation). 
 197. See Don Duffy, CEOs Need a “Healthy Paranoia” of Activist Investors, 
CNBC (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/12/ceos-need-a-healthy 
-paranoia-of-activist-investors-commentary.html (“The upsurge of shareholder 
activist campaigns in recent years has been a hot topic for corporate Ameri-
ca.”). Large companies are, however, subject to the opinions of investors in 
terms of management, governance, and direction. See id.  
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Threats of suit or actual litigation against small companies 
can have the effect of scaring away customers, suppliers, and 
other business partners, lowering stock prices and company 
valuations, disrupting mergers and acquisitions, distracting 
management, and prompting inefficient use of resources.198 
Business partners, when faced with the threat of litigation, 
may even decide a joint venture’s costs outweigh the benefits.199  
A patent infringement lawsuit may also be asserted at ex-
tremely inopportune times in an attempt to head off a small ri-
val’s momentum.200 In a real life example affecting valuations, a 
startup eyewear company named Ditto laid off four employees 
to defend a patent lawsuit and was later valued $3–4 million 
less than its pre-lawsuit valuation, hindering is ability to raise 
funds and compete in the eyewear market.201  
3. Foreclosing on Competition in Innovation 
Small businesses are more important innovators in the 
U.S. economy than large companies, raising concerns about 
privateering’s effects on competition in innovation.202 Small 
businesses generate more patents per employee than large 
companies,203 employ a greater percentage of all scientists and 
engineers (38% compared to 27% employed by large compa-
nies),204 and “a small firm patent is more likely than a large 
 
 198. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 23–24; Robert G. Eccles et al., 
Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2007), https://hbr.org/ 
2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks.  
 199. E.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced 
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 117–18 (2006); Jim Milliot, Startup 
Denies Competition Charges, But Will Close, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Jan. 3, 
2005), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/print/20050103/37732-startup 
-denies-competition-charges-but-will-close.html.  
 200. A lawsuit could be asserted right before a small business makes an 
initial public offering or starts offering a superior product in the marketplace. 
 201. Tucker, supra note 11, at 3.  
 202. See Lee-Makiyama, supra note 43 (noting that competition in innova-
tion is not just a domestic concern, but also an international one as nations 
begin to employ patent privateering).  
 203. See ANTHONY BREITZMAN & DIANA HICKS, AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL 
BUSINESS PATENTS BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE, at iii (Nov. 2008), 
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs335tot.pdf; U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADVOCACY: THE VOICE OF SMALL BUSINESS 
IN GOVERNMENT 3 (2012), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_ 
2012.pdf (stating that small businesses generate sixteen times more); Schmidt 
et al., Why “Patent Reform” Harms Innovative Small Businesses, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/25/why 
-patent-reform-harms-innovative-small-businesses/id= 4926 (five times more).  
 204. Schmidt et al., supra note 203.  
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firm patent to be among the top 1% of most frequently cited pa-
tents.”205 Indeed, some commentators have stated that small 
businesses “may well be most important to [the] economy as 
agents of change signaled by the fact that the small firm con-
tribution to innovation is most intense in leading edge technol-
ogies.”206  
Patent privateering is usually targeted at companies that 
are involved in high-tech patents, affecting competition in are-
as of cutting-edge innovation.207 In addition, high-tech patents 
tend to be more interchangeable and more likely to overlap, 
meaning that it is more difficult for small businesses to assess 
the validity of alleged infringement.208 Therefore, patent priva-
teering against small businesses can disproportionately fore-
close competition in innovation.209 This results in a prolongation 
of the technological status quo, which favors large incumbents 
but harms consumers through the stagnation of useful arts and 
sciences. 
 
 205. CHI RESEARCH, SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CON-
TRIBUTION TO CHANGE 3 (Feb. 27, 2003), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/ 
rs225tot.pdf.  
 206. Id. at 25; see also BREITZMAN & HICKS, supra note 203 (“[T]he patents 
of small firms in general are likely to be more technologically important than 
those of large firms.”). 
 207. See Chien, supra note 21, at 464 (stating that 60% of litigation de-
mands involved software or high-tech patents). Because small businesses de-
velop more high-tech patents, and high-tech patents tend to be used in lucra-
tive industries, this may partially explain why PAEs target small businesses 
more often than large companies. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 45, at 10. 
 208. Chien, supra note 31, at 1589; see also Economists’ Roundtable on Hot 
Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the diffi-
culty in assessing whether one’s products and services actually infringe on 
technological patents); Ewing, supra note 11, at 30 (stating that privateering 
is more prevalent in industries where patents are interchangeable because 
this makes it easier for the privateer to assert infringement with some appar-
ent validity); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the 
Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 17 (2014) 
(stating that deference to settlements of patent infringement suits exists be-
cause they are “plagued with validity and boundary problems so severe that 
judges cannot have a great deal of confidence in the courts”).  
 209. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 110, at 18–20; Chien, supra note 
21, at 474; Kiebzak et al., supra note 11, at 220; Muschick, supra note 182. For 
example, health IT companies have been found to cease all innovation in a 
given technology while being sued for patent infringement by a PAE. EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45. Another example is X-Plane, a com-
pany sued by Google, which abandoned development of certain new products 
altogether as a result of the lawsuit. Mullin, supra note 19. 
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The above-mentioned effects can disproportionately fore-
close competition by raising small rivals’ costs, forcing them to 
exit the market, discouraging rivals from entering the market, 
providing large sponsor companies with superior litigating po-
sitions, and reducing or foreclosing competition in innovation. 
All of these effects are anticompetitive in its most basic concept 
and consequently harm consumers and societal progress.210  
B. EXISTING COMMENTARY FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER  
HOW PATENT PRIVATEERING AFFECTS SMALL BUSINESSES 
Only a handful of commentators have addressed patent 
privateering and the application of antitrust law, and there are 
few cases even indirectly on point.211 Some commentators are 
hopeful that antitrust law holds a solution to counter the worst 
cases of patent privateering,212 but others disagree, concluding 
that outside limited scenarios, antitrust laws are inapplicable 
to patent privateering.213 All past commentators appear to 
agree that antitrust law probably cannot provide refuge from 
privateering for all businesses, but none have considered how 
small businesses are uniquely and disproportionately affected 
by patent privateering.  
This Section considers the viability of the antitrust coun-
terclaims and defenses discussed in Part I.C, in the same order. 
It closes by discussing the practical problem of concealed spon-
sor identity, which limits the availability of antitrust theories 
to counter privateering. 
 
 210. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 186, at 494–95. 
 211. There is, however, a current English case, which will be the first to 
consider “the phenomenon of patent privateering.” In Patent Portfolio Licens-
es, English Court Considers Patent Privateering and Gives Further Guidance 
on FRAND Terms, 4-TRADERS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.4-traders.com/ 
HUAWEI-TECHNOLOGY-CO-LTD-7785078/news/In-patent-portfolio 
-licences-English-Court-considers-patent-privateering-and-gives-further 
-guidance-21540123. The court appears to plan to address the privateering is-
sues in summer 2016. See id. 
 212. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 12; Popofsky & Laufert, su-
pra note 17, at 446–47.  
 213. See Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1265; Joshua D. Wright & 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A Competition 
Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501, 516 (2014); Joshua D. 
Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Dechert Client Annual 
Antitrust Spring Seminar 10 (Apr. 17, 2013), Westlaw 1728229. 
  
2196 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2167 
 
1. Section 1 Claims 
Section 1 claims involve contracts in restraint of trade be-
tween two or more competitors.214 When two competitors con-
tract to jointly sponsor and control a PAE, such would likely vi-
olate Section 1 because it would be obviously anticompetitive.215 
However, as explained earlier, such an arrangement would be 
extremely uncommon.  
By contrast, a privateering arrangement might involve an 
agreement between one sponsor and a privateered PAE.216 If 
the sponsor and PAE have a licensing or similar agreement, 
then a rule of reason analysis would be performed because 
agreements of this type are not currently per se violations. But 
because most privateering arrangements exist via transfers of 
ownership,217 Section 1 claims probably fail because no contract 
is involved.  
Even if a privateering arrangement is memorialized in the 
form of a license agreement, small business defendants may 
face another potential problem: the fact that the sponsor com-
pany maintains an ownership stake in the PAE, meaning the 
relationship could be a close one and not subject to Section 1 as 
a result. This is because parent companies are not liable for an-
ticompetitive arrangements with wholly-owned or substantial-
ly-controlled subsidiaries.218 Thus, this form of PAE sponsorship 
is insulated from Section 1 claims. 
Assuming this issue does not arise, though, a privateering 
agreement’s effects would most likely be more anticompetitive 
than pro-competitive when the privateering is directed against 
small businesses, for the reasons put forth in Part II.A. Howev-
er, this scenario is more susceptible to arguments for pro-
competitive benefits. For example, a PAE could be merely facil-
itating the assertion of patents in a more effective and efficient 
way than the sponsor company could on its own, freeing the 
sponsor to focus on other competitive activities such as R&D.219 
Given this benefit, commentators have argued that a court 
 
 214. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 215. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 12 (discussing how Nokia 
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Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 17, at 460–61 (discussing how competitors 
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 216. See Jurata & Patel, supra note 160, at 1267. 
 217. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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would likely not find that the agreement constitutes an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.220 However, the same commentators 
did not consider the unique ways in which patent privateering 
disproportionately affects small businesses, and the unbalanced 
effects stated in Part II.A are far from reasonable.221  
Except in the rare circumstance of co-sponsored patent pri-
vateering, Section 1 probably cannot readily provide a small 
business defendant relief under the antitrust laws because it is 
too easy for sponsors to create a privateering arrangement 
without drafting an agreement. In fact, the evidence suggests 
that this is already occurring.222  
2. Section 2 Claims 
Unlike Section 1 claims, which apply to agreements in re-
straint of trade, Section 2 claims prohibit monopolization, at-
tempts to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize.223 Because 
monopoly power is the ability “to foreclose competition, to gain 
a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor,”224 the 
analysis in Part II.A suggests that most instances of patent 
privateering against small businesses have the effect of grant-
ing sponsors greater market power. Even when a sponsor tar-
gets hundreds to thousands of small competitors, it may be said 
to obtain market power because its efforts could drive up costs 
for all small rivals in the industry as well as increase prices for 
consumers and reduce the availability of important goods and 
services from alternative, smaller businesses.225 Admittedly, 
courts may not be willing to adopt such a sweeping understand-
ing from the outset. 
In theory, most instances of patent privateering against 
small businesses are actionable under Section 2 if courts accept 
the above argument. Some commentators anticipate this un-
derstanding, pointing out, however, that the link between rais-
ing rivals’ costs to maintenance or acquisition of monopoly 
power must be strong.226 The analysis in Part II.A shows a siza-
 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at the Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 8, 2013), Westlaw 6037326.  
 222. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 2. 
 223. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2014); supra Part I.C.2. 
 224. Balto & Wolman, supra note 126, at 401. 
 225. See O’Toole, supra note 27, at 81. 
 226. See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 15, at 10–11; Popofsky & Laufert, 
supra note 17, at 456. 
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ble causal link, especially in view of the exacerbated effects pa-
tent privateering has on small businesses. If monopoly power 
can be established, the traditional unilateral monopolization 
claim proceeds to whether the patent privateering constitutes a 
willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.227 Since 
patent privateering is purposed on hindering rivals’ ability to 
compete with the sponsor, the mere existence of the arrange-
ment should establish the requisite intent.228  
However, since monopoly power is always viewed in rela-
tion to the market a potential monopolist occupies, Section 2 
claims must always be directed at sponsor companies.229 This is 
because PAEs do not operate in a given market, so they cannot 
be liable under Section 2 monopolization or attempts to monop-
olize. Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One illustrates this limi-
tation.230 In that case, Capital One counterclaimed Intellectual 
Ventures I, the largest PAE in the world,231 under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.232 Capital 
One also asserted patent misuse as a defense.233 Both counter-
claims and the misuse defense were dismissed, mostly due to 
the PAE’s lack of market power in the relevant market.234 How-
ever, if Capital One would have been able to determine the 
sponsor, a Section 2 claim should have been viable against that 
sponsor, joined by counterclaim. 
Given the detrimental impact patent privateering can have 
on small businesses, a small business defendant should also be 
able to successfully allege a sponsor’s dangerous possibility of 
achieving monopoly power for attempted monopolization 
claims.235 The extent of dangerousness may be debatable, de-
pending on the size and market power of the sponsor company, 
 
 227. See supra Part I.C.2.  
 228. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) 
(suggesting that predatory litigation in this way could be sufficient to show 
intent in monopolization claims).  
 229. See, e.g., PATENT LITIGATION PRACTICE NOTE, supra note 77 (“The al-
leged infringer would need to add the original patent holder as a counterclaim 
defendant and establish . . . monopoly in the relevant market.”). 
 230. See Memorandum Opinion, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital 
One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740-AJT-TCB (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013). 
 231. See Largest Patent Holdings, PATENTFREEDOM, https://www 
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the characteristics of the market, and the strategy pursued; the 
greater the market share and breadth of targeting, the more 
dangerous the probability. Since it is unlikely that large spon-
sors would engage in patent privateering (as opposed to simply 
suing in its own name) for non-competitive purposes, attempted 
monopoly claims should be successful if asserted against the 
sponsor. In instances of small companies using patent priva-
teering against similarly-sized rivals, an attempted monopoli-
zation claim is more questionable, but still very possible. 
Conspiracies to monopolize depend on similar factors as 
Section 1 and Section 2 claims, and authority suggests that 
such a claim may be asserted against any member of a conspir-
acy or all of them.236 This may be the best Section 2 claim if evi-
dence suggests that the PAE is engaged in privateering, but the 
sponsor is unknown and suspected to be a large market player. 
Still, ascertaining the sponsor company’s identity will be neces-
sary to prove the conspiracy. This practical difficulty seriously 
limits the ability to assert a successful Section 2 counter-
claim.237 
3. Handgards Claims 
Following the analysis above relating to Section 2 claims, a 
small business defendant could also assert a Handgards coun-
terclaim by arguing that the patents being asserted are invalid 
or that the suit is objectively baseless.238 This strategy would 
probably be most successful when the patent privateer asserts 
infringement of many different patents, using its large patent 
arsenal to artificially increase the size of the litigation threat, 
when no legitimate infringement exists at all or is highly ques-
tionable. This kind of claim could be expensive to prove, howev-
er, because it requires the small business defendant to make 
extensive legal arguments about the invalidity of the patents.239 
Sham litigation is also difficult to prove, and in high-tech 
industries, it may be impossible. This is because patents tend 
to be interchangeable and likely to overlap, making it difficult 
 
 236. See, e.g., United States v. Dunham Concrete Products, Inc., 501 F.2d 
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to establish that litigation is being pursued without an objec-
tive basis or in bad faith.240 Combined with the fact that patents 
enjoy a statutory presumption of validity,241 this makes a suc-
cessful Handgards claim unlikely for most general cases of pa-
tent privateering.  
Moreover, infringement actions of uncertain or dubious va-
lidity are protected conduct, even if the conduct has anticom-
petitive effects.242 Current Noerr-Pennington immunity protects 
patent holders from antitrust liability so long as their patents 
and lawsuits are not invalid or clearly meritless.243 This limita-
tion applies to any antitrust theory. In In re Innovatio IP Ven-
tures, LLC Patent Litigation, the court held that a PAE’s mass 
threat of assertion against thousands of small businesses, and 
eventual twenty-three lawsuits, was not objectively baseless 
and could be asserted despite the possibility that the PAE’s 
conduct had anticompetitive effects.244 Thus, so long as a priva-
teered PAE asserts patents against small business defendants 
with at least some validity, any Section 2 claim will probably 
fail under this case’s precedent.245  
Some have argued that it should matter “little whether the 
privateer’s case against the target is frivolous or has exception-
al merit.”246 Because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was created 
in a time before PAEs and patent privateering were common-
place, this argument has some persuasive weight. After all, 
when developing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the courts did 
not foresee or expect that the majority of patent litigation 
would turn into a game of indirect, secretive petitioning activi-
ty. And while the policy arguments favor protecting the right 
 
 240. Indeed, in the Handgards case itself, the patents involved were used 
in the manufacturing of plastic gloves and cannot fairly be described as high-
tech. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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712 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311–12 (D. Del. 2010). 
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for persons (whether natural or incorporeal) to petition the gov-
ernment, the antitrust implications seem to weigh heavily 
against applying the same protections to covert operatives su-
ing on sponsors’ behalf.  
If indeed a PAE is engaging in patent privateering, there 
should be no hesitation by a court to reject a Noerr-Pennington 
immunity argument. Although this immunity has been tied to 
whether a suit is meritless, the Handgards doctrine more 
broadly concerns whether a claim was brought for the relief 
sought, instead of primarily for the outcomes that result from 
the judicial process (such as a rival’s exiting the market under 
suit). Therefore, where patent privateering is employed against 
a small competitor, the likely motivations and outcomes that 
will result from such an action ought to in most cases over-
whelmingly demand the conclusion that Noerr-Pennington im-
munity does not apply. This reasoning comports with what 
Handgards claims are designed to address: the use of litigation 
as a weapon in a concealed attempt to interfere with a competi-
tor.247 Further, it ensures that courts, which are supposed to be 
a “defense against organized bullying,” do not “become the tools 
of organized bullying.”248 
In summary, a Section 2 claim, whether Handgards or not, 
should be successful in theory if a sponsor’s identity is known 
and the privateering relationship can be sufficiently pleaded.  
4. Section 7 Claims 
Some commentators suggest that the most “natural mech-
anism” to challenge patent privateering is Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, which prohibits acquisitions that may substantial-
ly lessen competition or create a monopoly.249 They argue that 
acquisitions of patents by privateered PAEs can harm competi-
tion by enhancing sponsors’ ability to “hinder or exclude rivals 
and thereby gain incremental market power” in much the same 
way as discussed in Parts II.A and II.B.1–3.250 Therefore, patent 
acquisitions by privateered PAEs could substantially lessen 
competition and may even create or maintain monopoly power 
for the sponsor. 
Other commentators dispute the anticompetitive effects of 
patent transfers, arguing that patent litigation by privateered 
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PAEs is no different than the exercise of the sponsor’s pre-
existing market power.251 However, as asserted in Parts I.B.4 
and II.B.2, patent privateering offers sponsors considerable 
benefits and negatively affects both targeted companies and 
consumers. Privateering also forecloses competition from small 
rivals in the market and in innovation.252 In addition, accumu-
lation of patents by privateers and their covert nature incentiv-
ize infringement lawsuits implicating as many patents as pos-
sible. This approach to patent litigation renders a patent 
lawsuit by a privateer more formidable than what could have 
been brought by its sponsor—but also more likely to be consid-
ered sham.  
Most commentators agree that acquisitions of patents by 
PAEs would probably violate Section 7 if the PAE aggregates 
all substitute patents for a certain kind of product or in a cer-
tain industry because this would enable a sponsor, through the 
PAE, to obtain and maintain monopoly power.253 The court 
found this in Kobe v. Dempsey Pump, in which Dempsey pur-
chased key patents for hydraulic oil pumps, and no competitor 
could make a product without infringing on at least one of the 
patents.254 The court held that the underlying purpose of accu-
mulating the patents was a violation of Section 7 and patent 
misuse.255 Similar reasoning could equally apply to patent pri-
vateers, which acquire patents in this way, especially if small 
businesses are targeted by privateers with comprehensive pa-
tent holdings.  
Despite the likelihood of success in bringing these, there 
are certain downfalls to them. For one, a patent privateering 
relationship may not entail patent transfers or acquisitions.256 
In addition, even if a sponsored PAE did acquire patents, it 
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might only acquire a specific set of patents needed to target a 
rival, eliminating the possibility that the Kobe precedence 
might apply. And furthermore, this claim suffers from the same 
practical difficulties in asserting the claim successfully in court, 
both in knowing enough about the relationship to meet plead-
ing requirements and a small target’s likely inability to afford 
to defend itself.257 
5. Patent Misuse Defenses 
It is unclear whether patent misuse could successfully be 
used to render a privateered patent unenforceable.258 This is 
primarily because patent misuse only applies to specific exten-
sions of a patent’s grant of monopoly power,259 which is limited 
to the exclusive right to make certain inventions and forbids 
the use of the patent to “secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly . . . contrary to public policy.”260 Usually, unlawful ex-
tensions of a patent grant involve attempting to merely enforce 
the patent’s power beyond its terms. 
However, to enable this defense in patent privateering sce-
narios, courts would need to accept the theory that privateered 
patent litigation is itself somehow an unlawful extension of the 
patent grant’s monopoly power. Arguably, patent privateering 
extends the utility of one or more patents beyond its limited 
scope by allowing sponsors to more effectively assert infringe-
ment of such patents than they could without the help of a 
PAE. Because small businesses are especially likely to respond 
to suits in ways that harm themselves and benefit large spon-
sors, patent privateers tend to be more effective at asserting 
patents against small businesses than large sponsors.261 In this 
way, the combination of the threat and the way the small busi-
ness defendant will likely respond to it extends a patent’s pow-
er beyond its power to exclusively sell an invention. A patent 
owner’s rights, by definition, include the right to threaten to 
exclude others from practicing a patent, but patent privateer-
ing makes the threat of infringement unusually powerful—and 
perhaps even more credible or seemingly more meritorious 
than it actually is. This effect then enables the patent owner to 
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secure a broader monopoly than is granted by the patent by its 
terms; by excluding a rival, for example, a patent owner might 
be able to secure monopoly over an entire industry or product 
market, let alone the specific inventions claimed by the patent. 
Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, seems to endorse this understanding: “Patents can pro-
mote innovation, but a patent is not a license to engage in de-
ception . . . . Small businesses . . . have the right to expect 
truthful communications . . . .”262 Without transparency, patent 
privateering may well be considered an unlawful extension of a 
patent’s limited monopoly power and a predatory litigation tac-
tic. 
Assuming that a court might also accept this argument, 
patent misuse will not protect a small business defendant from 
future suit because it is only a defense. It might, however, force 
the sponsor company to sue the small business in its own name 
to cure the misuse resulting from covert enforcement. Thus, the 
sponsor company would then be subject to the normal incen-
tives and consequences of suing smaller rivals for patent in-
fringement—a result that is overall better for society and more 
in line with the goals of patent and antitrust law. 
6. The Problem of Concealed Sponsor Identity  
Despite the analyses above, which argue that some anti-
trust theories could be successful depending on the circum-
stances, it is unlikely that a small business defendant can ever 
bring any of these theories. This is because the current patent 
system precludes, in most circumstances, a small business de-
fendant from acquiring specific or circumstantial knowledge of 
a privateering arrangement.263 Patent ownership, transfers, 
and licensing agreements are usually secret.264 Since a small 
business defendant may never know who is sponsoring a PAE 
or if a PAE is sponsored at all, the small business defendant 
will be unable to plead an antitrust counterclaim or defense in 
the first place without being conclusory.265 This was, arguably, 
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partially the problem in Intellectual Ventures.266 Further, this 
inability may incentivize suits and make a market less attrac-
tive to potential new entrants, foreclosing future competition. 
For Section 1 claims, this means that the small business 
defendant will not know if there is an agreement between com-
petitors or a sponsor and PAE. For Section 2 claims, the con-
cealed identity of the sponsor presents similar difficulties, in 
that a small business defendant will be unable to determine 
which competitor is primarily benefiting from the suspected pa-
tent privateering arrangement. Likewise, for Section 7 claims, 
a patent seller will be unknown, so that a claim against the in-
directly benefiting sponsor-seller cannot be asserted. Similarly, 
patent misuse defenses will be seen as merely speculative un-
less the small business defendant can pinpoint the sponsor 
company. Lack of knowledge about the identity of a sponsor 
eliminates the ability for defendants to retaliate with not only 
patent infringement claims, but also other types of claims as 
well, including those grounded in antitrust law.  
There are further practical difficulties in determining the 
identity of a sponsor. First, ownership is not required in order 
to establish a privateering arrangement.267 Second, PAEs may 
be established in venues with inhospitable piercing law, mak-
ing it harder to pierce a corporate veil and identify a sponsor.268 
Third, many PAEs create further shell companies to assert pa-
tents, which would complicate veil piercing.269 These layers also 
increase the likelihood a PAE and its sponsor remain anony-
mous in future suits, even if one of their many shell companies’ 
veils are pierced and disclosed at trial.  
Even if a small business defendant does have knowledge of 
a privateering relationship and could successfully assert an an-
titrust counterclaim, small businesses must still choose to do 
so. The analysis in Part II.A shows that most small businesses 
cannot litigate in the first place, finding it both necessary and 
prudent to settle due to their limited operational and financial 
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means. PAE defenders have argued that this effect of PAE pa-
tent litigation is a USPTO and litigation problem, not an anti-
trust one.270 While the way that small businesses respond to 
privateered litigation threats may be a symptom of litigation, 
the purposes of the privateering arrangement are of the kind 
antitrust law is designed to prevent.271  
In summary, commentators have considered antitrust law 
as a potential solution to address patent privateering against 
all businesses. As a result, most agree that current antitrust 
law might only stop patent privateering in rare circumstanc-
es—perhaps when small businesses are targets. In addition, 
the analysis above shows that there are several practical rea-
sons for why, even if theoretically antitrust law is a solution, 
such claims and defenses would likely fail to make it past the 
pleading stage of litigation. Technicalities and Noerr-
Pennington immunity may also restrict the ability for current 
antitrust law to bar patent privateering outright. And even if 
antitrust law may theoretically already provide a solution for 
small businesses sued by patent privateers, the realities of the 
situation make it either too difficult or too costly to pursue the 
solution. Part III provides a solution to all these problems. 
III.  REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS PROVIDE A 
SOLUTION   
In the past several years, little has been done to address 
patent privateering. This Part provides a comprehensive solu-
tion to the anticompetitive effects of patent privateering 
against small businesses—the only kind of businesses substan-
tially affected by privateering’s patent litigation activities. Sec-
tion A showcases this solution in the form of rebuttable pre-
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sumption to be applied by courts. Section B compares this solu-
tion to other proposals recommended by scholars and reasons 
that only the solution proposed in Section A can adequately ad-
dress the patent privateering. Lastly, Section C addresses the 
policy implications of the solution proposed in Section A in the 
realms of antitrust law, patent law, and Noerr-Pennington im-
munity. 
A. THE PROPOSAL FOR A SECTION 2 ANTITRUST VIOLATION  
PRESUMPTION 
As the analysis of Section 2 antitrust liability in Parts 
II.B.2–3 shows, in most cases patent privateering against small 
businesses constitutes an antitrust violation. Other kinds of an-
titrust liability are less likely to be successful and more attenu-
ated. Section 2 antitrust liability can address every patent pri-
vateering activity, however.272 Therefore, a presumption of 
Section 2 liability would provide the most protection without 
establishing a potentially too-sweeping presumption (say, of 
any kind of Sherman or Clayton Act liability).  
Because patent privateering has significantly anticompeti-
tive effects when targeted against small businesses (but not 
when against large ones), a rebuttable presumption of antitrust 
liability must be carefully tailored to protect small businesses. 
In contexts involving patent privateering against a small busi-
ness, proving circumstantial anticompetitive effects should not 
be a major difficulty since, on the whole, the analysis in Part 
II.A indicates that patent privateering as a nationwide practice 
harms competition and consumers. However, the ability to 
prove that a privateering relationship exists is a formidable 
hurdle.273 What is needed is a presumption structured in such a 
way to remove this hurdle, while also allowing for the assertion 
of good faith patent litigation suits; the presumption should not 
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be overly broad, nor should it be too narrow. Therefore, a solu-
tion must presume that any circumstances suggesting a strong 
likelihood of patent privateering against a small business is un-
lawful as a violation of Section 2.274  
Courts, legislatures, and/or regulators should adopt a re-
buttable presumption that a patent infringement lawsuit vio-
lates Section 2 as either monopolization, an attempt to monopo-
lize or maintain monopoly power, or a conspiracy to monopolize 
or maintain monopoly power in circumstances that are all but 
certain to indicate a privateering relationship. This presump-
tion would only apply when small businesses are being sued by 
a PAE, which does not practice the patents in suit. Small busi-
nesses could be defined according to the Small Business Asso-
ciation’s size standards, per industry.275 In cases against these 
so-defined small businesses, the likelihood of patent privateer-
ing and the risk of harm to competition is great enough to justi-
fy this presumption.  
However, a PAE plaintiff should be allowed and entitled to 
show that it is not a patent privateer. By providing easy-to-
obtain, basic factual evidence, good faith plaintiffs should be 
able to rebut this presumption with only a slight burden. Ideal-
ly, rebutting evidence should relate to indicia of non-
privateering relationships. For example, a plaintiff could show 
one of two “outs”: either that (1) the plaintiff is not a PAE, or 
(2) the plaintiff is a PAE, but has no material ties to a competi-
tor with monopoly power or close to market power in the mar-
ket for the patent(s) being asserted. A PAE would be defined as 
any person who is not an original inventor, a company that 
substantially practices the patent, a university, or a technology 
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number of business torts or consumer protection regimes may also be viable 
alternatives. This Note, however, considers only antitrust law due to the pow-
erful anticompetitive effects in play and the danger of monopolization. Both of 
these negative effects are primarily addressed by antitrust law—though, other 
doctrines may also be applicable.  
 275. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STAND-
ARDS MATCHED TO NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
CODES (2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_ 
Table.pdf. This per-industry classification takes into account the relative size 
of an industry and its market participants. A small business could also be de-
fined as any business with less than $100M in revenue each year. Chien, su-
pra note 21, at 464, 475, showed that companies making less than $100M per 
year constituted the majority of defendants in PAE patent infringement law-
suits. Firms making more than $100M per year were also less affected by such 
lawsuits. Id. Therefore, the small businesses affected most by patent priva-
teering probably make less than $100M in revenue per year.  
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transfer organization solely purposed on commercializing tech-
nology developed by institutions of higher education.276 In re-
gard to the second out, most non-PAE operating companies 
could easily prove that they substantially practice their pa-
tents, so this presumption would have a de minimis effect on 
them. Additionally, a presumption structured with these outs 
would not prevent universities from protecting their patent 
rights or the patent rights of their researchers. Lastly, inven-
tors would be protected due to their non-inclusion as PAEs or 
outsourcing to technology transfer organizations. These kinds 
of PAE sponsors would have no competitive reason for refusing 
to disclose their identity. It may even be to the PAE’s ad-
vantage to make such disclosure, as the sponsor’s identity may 
engender sympathy or respect from fact-finders.  
If, however, the plaintiff is a PAE (the first out), it would 
have to prove that it has no ties to any competitors—especially 
large competitors—with market power or dangerously close to 
market power in the market for the patent(s) being asserted. 
Such evidence would be harder to provide, but not unduly bur-
densome. This would require the PAE plaintiff to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence277 that (1) there is no dominant (or 
close to dominant) competitor278 practicing the patent, whether 
licensed to or from, and (2) there is no formal or informal 
agreement or arrangement in which any third parties to the 
lawsuit have any form of economic or non-economic interest in 
the outcome of the infringement lawsuit or use of the patents 
being asserted, including subsidiary, intermediary, and ulti-
mate owners, of any percentage, of the PAE, itself.279 Framing 
the exclusion this broadly would ensure that no conceivable 
form of privateering relationship exists between the PAE and 
any dominant (or near dominant) competitors in the market. If 
 
 276. This list is borrowed from the SHIELD Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 2 
(b), (d) (2013). 
 277. This standard was chosen due to the harmful effects of patent priva-
teering against small businesses and the need to provide small business de-
fendants with hope that the rebuttable presumption may save them from legal 
costs. Courts may find, however, that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is more appropriate, given the potential First Amendment implica-
tions. 
 278. A large competitor would be whatever is not a small competitor (those 
companies making over $100M per year). 
 279. Essentially, this provision relates to the various ways in which a pri-
vateering relationship may be structured, in order to preclude any possible 
formal privateering arrangement from rebutting the presumption. See supra 
Part I.B.3 for an overview of these possible arrangements.  
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there is no such relationship, then antitrust concerns are alle-
viated, and the suit is likely one brought by a non-privateered 
PAE.  
Lastly, the presumption should be rebutted in the event 
that Section 2 liability can be otherwise disclaimed or disprov-
en by the PAE-plaintiff. 
If enforced, this rebuttable presumption would prevent pa-
tent privateers from suing small businesses for patent in-
fringement and force dominant or nearly dominant sponsors to 
sue in their own names instead. As a result, the incentives and 
consequences of traditional patent litigation would inure to 
both plaintiffs and defendants. The anticompetitive effects of 
patent privateering would be lifted or at least extremely lim-
ited. In addition, the frequency of patent litigation would likely 
decrease, as large sponsors would no longer be able to avoid the 
various costs to them that are otherwise avoided through pa-
tent privateering. This would likely have public benefits, such 
as reducing the burden and congestion on the public court sys-
tem and increasing consumer and business faith in the justice 
system as a whole.  
B. A PRESUMPTION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHER  
PROPOSALS 
The presumption sketched out in Section A is likely to be 
more effective than other solutions currently proposed. Recall 
that most commentators have proposed changes to the patent 
system in order to address patent privateering.280 One set of 
proposals in this area requires parties to a patent infringement 
lawsuit to list all persons with an interest in the outcome of the 
case.281 This, the proponents argue, would help alleviate the 
problem of concealed sponsors by providing defendants with at 
least some circumstantial evidence of a possible privateering 
relationship. However, these reforms would have to be worded 
to account for both ownership and licensing interests to capture 
the full range of formal patent privateering arrangements, 
ownership, license, or otherwise.282 The presumption envisioned 
 
 280. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 281. See Ewing, supra note 15, at 120–21; O’Toole, supra note 27, at 70–72 
(citing H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2014) and S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2014)) (dis-
cussing the America Invents Act). 
 282. The White House lists real party in interest disclosures as a top prior-
ity for future PAE legislation. FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-
Tech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
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above does this; and while such language could be adopted to 
provide for this solution, a disclosure mechanism would still 
present likely difficulties that are not encountered with a pre-
sumption.  
For one, the timing of such disclosures would have to be 
early, so that small business defendants could quickly assess 
whether to defend or not. Timing of other important early dis-
closures, such as claim construction in Markman hearings, con-
tinues to be subject to judicial discretion and great variabil-
ity.283 Further, the creation of a disclosure requirement, even if 
properly timed, would also require the courts to recognize the 
antitrust liability arguments proposed in Part II.A, which un-
derlie the presumption formulated above in Section A. There-
fore, a disclosure requirement would require more moving parts 
than a presumption.  
Lastly, a disclosure requirement would likely not have the 
same preclusive and deterrent effect of a presumption. A patent 
privateer might still sue a small business target hoping the 
target will respond in a way desirable to the privateer’s spon-
sor.284 The privateer could take this chance and may never need 
to disclose its identity at all. With the proposed presumption, 
the privateer would bear the initial onus to prove its non-
anticompetitive nature to the court before proceeding against 
the small business target.285 Until proven, a small business 
would not have much risk and may even respond to see wheth-
er the good faith nature of the suit is proven. Due to the ways 
in which small businesses respond to threats of patent litiga-
tion,286 this early burden-switch is desirable and necessary to 
prevent patent privateering and its effects. A disclosure re-
quirement would not accomplish such a goal.  
Other reforms, most notably the SHIELD Act, aim to coun-
teract the incentives for PAEs to litigate by imposing fee-
 
the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent 
-issues.  
 283. See James P. Flynn, Markman: Courts Continue To Differ over Timing 
of Claims Construction, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www 
.ebglaw.com/news/markman-courts-continue-to-differ-over-timing-of-claims 
-construction.  
 284. See supra Part II.A. 
 285. It may even face sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 if it cannot prove 
this right away—an adequate deterrent.  
 286. They usually respond in ways that are anticompetitive and enable 
monopoly for large sponsors. See supra Part II.A. 
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shifting mechanisms.287 However, these reforms cannot fully 
offset the competitive advantages of patent privateering when 
unleashed against small businesses because most small rivals 
will choose to settle before even defending themselves.288 If the 
analysis in Part II is sound, small businesses should choose not 
to settle; antitrust law already provides for treble damages, fee-
shifting, and criminal liability.289 But the evidence shows the 
opposite. Therefore, a proposal like the SHIELD Act would like-
ly have no practical effect on the incidence of patent privateer-
ing. Even if it provided another avenue of recovering costs, 
small businesses are unlikely to be willing to front the bill for 
potentially several years of litigation. 
Lastly, a blanket prohibition against the use of PAEs in 
patent litigation would probably not curb patent privateering.290 
First, it would be difficult for courts to determine if a company 
truly is a PAE or not, given the secretiveness of privateering 
arrangements. A court could employ the same criteria as listed 
in the proposed presumption in Section A, but if it did so, it 
might as well simply employ the presumption anyway. Second, 
benign uses of PAEs for litigation by inventors, universities, 
and small firms would be unjustifiably enjoined.291 A blanket 
prohibition on privateering would thus be overly broad. Third, 
prohibition would still not solve the evidentiary difficulty of 
discovering the existence of a privateering arrangement or the 
identity of a sponsor.292 Fourth, such a prohibition may violate 
Noerr-Pennington immunity, established by the First Amend-
ment. A presumption, on the other hand, succumbs to none of 
these difficulties.293 
 
 287. See H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th 
-congress/house-bill/845/text (providing fees for a defendant who prevails in a 
patent infringement lawsuit).  
 288. See Chien, supra note 21, at 485 (“[O]ne problem with a number of 
these reforms is that they don’t directly or necessarily help those against 
whom litigation is threatened, but not brought.”). 
 289. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 290. Cf. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 505–06 (noting Professor 
Tim Wu’s proposal to exterminate all PAEs).  
 291. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Address at the Hearing on Digital Economy Over-
sight of Innovation Catalysts of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 4 (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/ 
49623337.pdf.  
 292. See Ewing, supra note 11, at 80.  
 293. See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of the First Amendment issue. 
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A rebuttable presumption is not an uncommon mechanism 
in antitrust law.294 Therefore, it is more likely that courts or 
legislative bodies would be comfortable in employing such a 
tool. Federal courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption in 
at least one instance involving patent litigation already.295 Giv-
en the precedents already set by the federal courts and the fact 
that this solution would likely be most effective at deterring pa-
tent privateering, it should be adopted.  
C. POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to comparing the presumption laid out in Sec-
tion A to other proposals, there are several policy considera-
tions that must be made. This Subsection explores two primary 
policy considerations: (1) the policies underlying both antitrust 
and patent law, and (2) First Amendment, Noerr-Pennington 
protections.  
1. Antitrust and Patent Law 
Recall that antitrust law is purposed on prohibiting com-
petitor conduct that unjustifiably forecloses and harms con-
sumers.296 One way in which antitrust accomplishes this is by 
prohibiting monopolies. Recall also that patent law is purposed 
on promoting innovation by enticing inventors with the ability 
to hold a limited monopoly over the use of their inventions.297 
Patent law, too, encourages healthy competition by incentiviz-
ing competitors to constantly invent new innovations that are 
useful to society.  
A presumption in favor of antitrust liability when a patent 
monopoly is used to attain monopolies outside of the patent 
grant and injure rivals is supported by both antitrust and pa-
tent law policy. It is easy enough to see why antitrust law 
would favor this presumption given the harmful effects that 
flow from patent privateering.298 Indeed, foreign regulators al-
 
 294. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 14–17; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Set-
tlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of 
Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069 (2004) 
(calling for a rebuttable presumption of illegality for patent settlements in-
volving reverse payments). 
 295. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 
1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 296. See supra Part I.C; see also supra note 271.  
 297. See supra Part I.A. 
 298. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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ready recognize this fact; the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC), for example, recently established that patent priva-
teering is “abusive or unreasonable.”299 The presumption envi-
sioned in Section A would comport with this policy and with the 
public policy of the antitrust laws: to ensure fair competition 
between all businesses—not competition based on intimidation 
and availability of financial resources for litigation. 
Antitrust and patent policy further favors stopping de-
structive patent privateering against small businesses because 
small businesses serve extremely important roles in the U.S. 
economy and innovation.300 Disincentivizing covert patent liti-
gation against small businesses also comports with the public 
goal to “foster . . . small business growth and development.”301 
Although it would appear that a patent holder’s rights to 
exclude others from using an invention through litigation could 
be inhibited by the presumption advanced in Section A, the op-
posite is true. Rather, the presumption set forth in Section A 
only prevents a large sponsor from using PAEs to litigate pa-
tent rights without a public connection to the sponsor.  
Preventing patent privateering would also not detract from 
the incentive that a patent monopoly provides inventors, unless 
those inventors are incentivized to apply for patents in order to 
covertly wield a club over a rival’s head in the hopes of exclud-
ing them from the market over the long-term. Certainly, such a 
“right” was not intended to be part of the incentive for an in-
ventor. Given that patent law intends to promote progress 
through incentives and competition, the incentives cannot logi-
cally include such anti-competitive and regressive ends. The 
rebuttable presumption proposed in Section A would thus elim-
inate the incentive to use a patent in a way that expands be-
yond the rights of a patent’s limited monopoly.  
2. First Amendment 
Recall that Noerr-Pennington immunity provides that per-
sons may petition the government through litigation and that 
 
 299. Bart Eppenauer, Emerging Antitrust Regulation of Intellectual Proper-
ty Licensing in Asia, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog 
.com/2015/08/16/emerging-antitrust-regulation-of-intellectual-property 
-licensing-in-asia/id=60693 (noting that both China and Korea have attempted 
to preempt patent privateering and similar activity already seen in the U.S., 
but not yet prevalent in Asia).  
 300. See Liu, supra note 179, at 499–500.  
 301. Id. at 500. 
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the First Amendment protects this activity.302 However, as has 
been established in the Handgards cases, no person may peti-
tion the government in meritless ways as a strategy to harm 
competitors and consumers.303 Usually, this is found when a 
lawsuit is focused not on the outcome of the case on the merits, 
but instead on the anticompetitive results of the judicial pro-
cess (sham litigation). 
The presumption in Section A may be said to stand as a 
bar—albeit an extremely small one—to petitioning the govern-
ment. However, it should be thought of as barring secretive and 
vindictive petitioning conduct. The presumption’s narrow tai-
loring only applies to manners of speech (patent privateering) 
that significantly bear on important societal and governmental 
interests. As the Supreme Court has consistently stated, the 
right to freedom of speech (and any constitutional right) is not 
absolute; for example, restrictions have been justified in com-
mercial speech cases where, generally speaking, restrictions 
are content neutral, narrowly tailored, serve significant gov-
ernmental interests, and leave room for alternative channels of 
communication.304 The Handgards cases and Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine reflects this same understanding by prohibiting merit-
less litigation.  
The proposed presumption would survive a First Amend-
ment challenge because it is content neutral, narrowly tailored 
to patent privateering against small competitors (which has 
been shown to be very anti-competitive), imposes a minimal 
burden, serves the interests of promoting and protecting fair 
competition and consumers, and does not affect the ability of 
large sponsors to sue small rivals for patent infringement in 
their own name (an alternative). And since covert patent priva-
teering can only have anticompetitive purposes underlying it, it 
is a sham and thus a recognized and appropriate exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.  
 
 302. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 138–40 (1961); Ewing, supra note 15, at 139; Roszkowski & Bru-
baker, supra note 147, at 416. 
 303. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979); 
see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 
(1991). 
 304. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).  
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  CONCLUSION   
Policy-makers have become increasingly wary of PAE pa-
tent acquisition and assertion activities. Through licensing or 
transfers of patents, sponsor companies can direct—or priva-
teer—PAEs to sue competitors for patent infringement in an 
effort to raise rivals’ costs, hinder rivals’ ability to compete, and 
forestall and foreclose competition from existing and potential 
rivals. These anticompetitive effects inflate sponsor companies’ 
market power, at the expense of competition, regulation, inno-
vation, and consumer welfare. When patent privateering is tar-
geted against small businesses, these effects are exacerbated. 
Small rivals are uniquely and disproportionately affected by 
patent privateering and are more likely to succumb to its anti-
competitive effects.  
Most solutions proposed to address this problem involve in-
creasing transparency, cost-shifting or sanctioning, and lifting 
or piercing the corporate veil concealing a sponsor company’s 
identity. There are ways for sponsors to circumvent these re-
forms, however, and disclosure mechanisms do not adequately 
address mismatched incentives and privateering behavior. 
Cost-shifting and blanket prohibitions succumb to similar 
weaknesses. This Note proposes an alternative solution, in the 
form of a rebuttable presumption of Section 2 antitrust liabil-
ity. This presumption would operate when small businesses are 
sued by PAEs for patent infringement and would deter patent 
privateering against small businesses. As a result, large com-
petitors could no longer employ covert patent litigation as a 
way to foreclose competition among small rivals and new inno-
vators in the marketplace, thus protecting and promoting a 
competitive American economy.  
 
